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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arose from two contractors' failed attempt to extract $1.9 million from the State 
of Idaho after the State decided to terminate a construction contract. One of the contractors even 
went so far as to file a defamation suit against the State employees who administered the 
Contract, which action was summarily dismissed. The contractors caused the State to incur 
hundreds of thousands of dollars defending against their exorbitant and unjustified demand as 
well as repairing their grossly deficient work. The district court agreed that the contractors' 
interpretation of the contract did not allow them to seek the sums demanded; however, it also 
unfortunately determined that the State could not seek any offsets to the contractors' claims or 
seek reimbursement for costs expended to repair their deficient work. Thereafter, the parties 
reached a negotiated settlement with the State agreeing to pay one of the contractors $225,000, 
without any admission of liability. Incredibly, both contractors then claimed they were entitled 
to an award of attorney fees and costs in excess of $850,000 as prevailing parties and have 
appealed the district court's denial of that request. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On October 26, 2005, Appellant Hobson Fabricating Corp. ("Hobson") filed a Complaint 
against Appellant SE/Z Construction, LLC ("SE/Z") and Respondent State of Idaho, Division of 
Public Works (the "State") for damages related to the construction of a Level 3 BioSafety Lab 
(the "Lab" or the "Project") in Boise, Idaho. (R. Vol. I, pp. 35-62). SE/Z was the Project's 
general contractor and Hobson was SE/Z's mechanical subcontractor (collectively, the 
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"Contractors"). Attached to Hobson's Complaint was its Notice of Tort Claim against the State 
which identified its damages as $1,556,930.44. (R. Vol. I, pp. 52-62). SE/Z then filed a cross-
claim against the State, in which it asserted claims on behalf of itself and its subcontractors 
related to the Project. (R. Vol. I, pp. 71-78). SE/Z provided the State with an original claim 
amount on the Project of $1,973,107.38, which included claims from Hobson. (R. Vol. V, 979-
997). The State, in turn, filed counter-claims against Hobson, as well as cross-claims against 
SE/Z. (R. Vol. I, pp. 97-104; pp. 105-114). The State also filed a third-party claim against 
Rudeen & Associates ("Rudeen"), the Project architect, related to Hobson and SE/Z's claims of 
design error as well as other acts and omissions. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1 15-173). On January 10, 2006, 
Hobson filed a Complaint against several employees of the State alleging slander, tortious 
interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations. (R. Vol. I, pp. 193-199). The slander causes of action and the Project causes of action 
were consolidated. (R. Vol. II, pp. 200-202). 
Substantial motion practice took place during the course of this litigation. Specifically, 
SE/Z and/or Hobson moved for summary judgment or partial summary judgment on numerous 
occasions with regard to the State's affirmative claims, offsets and defenses based on various 
grounds. These motions were denied in 2006, 2007 and 2008 based on genuine issues of 
material fact and the State was allowed to continue to pursue its claims, offsets and defenses 
based upon SE/Z and Hobson's defective work. 
In April 2007, Hobson's claims against the individual Defendants were dismissed 
pursuant to a partial summary judgment. (R. Vol. II, pp. 250-273). Also in 2007, the Court 
- 2 -
dismissed all direct claims between Hobson and the State. (R. Vol. II, pp. 238-249; pp. 250-273). 
As a result of the district court's rulings, the only remaining claims were Hobson's claims 
against SE/Z, SE/Z's claims against the State for termination for convenience damages, and the 
State's claims against SE/Z and Rudeen. 
In October 2008, this case was tried for 11 days until a mistrial was declared. (R. Vol. 
III, pp. 437-438). The district court subsequently froze discovery and motion practice except for 
motions in limine related to trial evidence. (R. Vol. III, p. 438). In March 2010, the district court 
heard, over the State's objections, Hobson's Motions in Limine and Motion to Dismiss Rudeen, 
and subsequently granted the motions. (R. Vol. IV, pp. 619-629). By so ruling, the district court 
reversed itself on all of its previous rulings and dismissed the State's claims and offsets related to 
the Contractors' defective work. (R. Vol. IV, pp. 625-626). Following the district court's rulings, 
the State and SE/Z entered into their settlement. (R. Vol. IV, pp.746-749). 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
On or about July 31, 2003, the State awarded a contract ("the Principal Contract" or "the 
Contract") to SE/Z for "DPW Project #02-353, Health and Welfare Remodel State Lab for BSL-
3" (the "Project"). (R. Vol. II, pp. 330-352). The Project involved the construction of a Level 3 
Bio-Safety Lab (the "Lab") in Boise, Idaho. The Lab, once constructed, was intended to serve as 
a facility capable of handling extremely dangerous substances, such as anthrax or avian flu virus, 
enabling the State to analyze and contain such substances. Affidavit of Elaine Hill in Support of 
Defendant State of Idaho's Opposition to Hobson Fabricating Corp.'s and SE/Z Construction, 
LLC's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment ("Hill Aff."), '1 2, filed on May 22, 2006; 
" - -' -
Affidavit of Albert F. Munio in Support of Defendant State of Idaho's Opposition to Hobson 
Fabricating Corp.'s and SE/Z Construction, LLC's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
("Munio Aff."), ~ 10 filed on May 22, 2006; Affidavit of Joe Rutledge in Support of Defendant 
State of Idaho's Opposition to Hobson Fabricating Corp.'s and SE/Z Construction, LLC's 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment ("Rutledge Aff."), ~ 8 filed on May 22,2006. 1 Because 
of the unique purpose of the Lab, it was absolutely critical that the facility be constructed 
correctly, as specified by the construction documents, to ensure that the substances handled in 
the Lab would not endanger employees of the Lab or the surrounding citizenry. Munio Afr. ~1O. 
On or about August 25, 2003, SE/Z signed a Subcontract Agreement ("the Subcontract") 
with Hobson, whereby Hobson agreed to perform mechanical work on the Project as SE/Z's sub-
contractor. (R. Vol. III, pp. 418-427). The mechanical work on the Project was the most critical 
component for the safe operation of the facility, as it involved the exhaust systems, which were 
intended to filter and capture the dangerous substances handled in the Lab and prevent them 
from being released into the Lab or the atmosphere. Hill Aff. ~ 9; Munio Afr. ~ 10. Work on the 
Project commenced in approximately September 2003, with an anticipated completion date of 
May 26, 2004. Hill Aff. ~ 3; Affidavit of Jan Frew in Support of Defendant State of Idaho's 
Opposition to Hobson Fabricating Corp. 's and SE/Z Construction, LLC's Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment ("Frew Aff. "), ~ 2. 2 
I These affidavits have been submitted with the State's Motion to Augment the Record and are attached thereto for 
reference. 
2 The Affidavit of Jan Frew has been submitted with the State's Motion to Augment the Record. 
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Various issues with the Contactors' workmanship arose during the Project. For example, 
In approximately January 2004, the State and the engineer on the Project, Traci Hanegan, 
discovered that Hobson had installed an inferior grade of stainless steel with respect to the 
ductwork. Hill Aff. ~ 5; Frew Aff. ~ 3; Rutledge Aff. ~ 3. In addition, in the Spring and Summer 
of 2004, the State brought in a third-party welding inspector, Mark Bell, to inspect Hobson's 
welds on the ductwork. Hill Aff. ,r 6 and Ex. A; Frew AfT. ~ 4; Rutledge AfT. ~ 4. Mr. Bell 
discovered on both occasions that Hobson recklessly performed defective welding. Id. By this 
point in time, the Project was considerably delayed, due, in large part, to Hobson's actions. Hill 
'I~ 5, 7; Frew Aff. ~~ 3, 5-6; Rutledge Aff. ,r,r 5-6. In the Spring of 2005, the State discovered 
that Hobson had negligently failed to install dampers clearly specified in the construction 
documents. Hill Aff. ~ 7; Frew Aff. ~ 5; Rutledge Aff. ~ 5. These dampers were critical to the 
successful filtration and capture of substances handled in the Lab, and were necessary to prevent 
the release of such substances into the outside air. Hill Aff. ~ 7. This incident resulted in further 
delay of the Project, which, by this time, appeared to be making no progress towards completion. 
Hill Aff. ~ 7; Frew Aff. 'l~ 5-6; Rutledge Aff. ~'r 5-6. SE/Z, as the general contractor, failed to 
keep the Project on schedule. Hill AfQ17. 
In June 2005, the State, believing the Project was 90% complete and would require only a 
relatively small sum of money to reach completion, decided to terminate its Contract with SE/Z 
for convenience. Hill Aff. ~ 8; Frew Aff. ~ 6; Rutledge Aff. ~ 6. Following its termination for 
convenience, the State retained Washington Group International ("WGI") to inspect the work 
completed on the Project in order to determine what work was still needed to reach completion. 
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Hill Aff. ~ 9; Munio Aff. ~ 2; Frew Aff. ~7; Rutledge Aff. ~ 7. WGI discovered that the 
mechanical work completed by Hobson was unacceptable by normal industry standards, was 
grossly defective, and deviated grossly from the Contract specifications. Munio Aff. ~~ 4-11, 
12-13 and Ex. B; Frew Aff. ~ 7; Rutledge Aff. ,r 7; Hill Aff. ~ 9. WGI's inspection revealed 
serious concealed defects with Hobson's work, including unacceptable weld conditions (such as 
a failure to "purge" the welds with argon gas) and seriously damaged materials due to 
installation error. Jd. As constructed, the Lab could not operate safely. Munio Aff. ~ 10. The 
original Contract with SE/Z provided a budget of $1,314,883 to complete the entire Project. (R. 
Vol. II, p. 331). Hobson was to receive a total of $657,500 for its work on the Project. (R. Vol. 
III, p. 419). Despite the fact that Hobson had allegedly completed approximately 90% of its 
work on the Project, in order to bring the Project to completion, the State was forced to replace 
much of Hobson's mechanical work at a cost then estimated at well over one million dollars. 
Munio Aff. ~~ 3, 12; Munio Aff., Ex. B, p. 11711; Hill Aff. ~ 9. In other words, the State was in 
a situation where it believed it had to expend more than the original Contract price for Hobson's 
work-and nearly the full original Contract price for the entire Project-to bring the Lab to 
completion in accordance with the Contract specifications and in a manner that ensured the 
safety of the surrounding citizenry. 
On October 4, 2005, the State received a Request for Equitable Adjustment ("REA") 
from SE/Z seeking an additional $1,973,107.39 over and above the payments it had already 
received. (R. Vol. V, 979-997). The Contractors claimed the termination for convenience 
allowed them to recover all costs incurred while performing their work on the Project. 
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During the course of the lengthy litigation, the Project was rebuilt. During the rebuild, 
numerous new and significant defects were discovered, which required additional time, materials 
and expense above and beyond the original estimate provided by WGI. (R. Vol. VI, 1031-Vol. 
VII, 1384). These additional defects included paint peeling off of the drywall throughout the 
Lab due to insufficient cleaning of the drywall prior to application of the paint, which resulted in 
extensive rework and costs. Id. It was further discovered that SE/Z had failed to secure the 
BioSafety Cabinets in the Lab or properly attach the cabinets in the Lab rooms to the wall, all of 
which would have created extremely hazardous conditions had they not been discovered. Id. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)( 1 )(B) prevailing party 
analysis apply to determine a prevailing party under I.C. § 12-117? 
2. If an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(B) prevailing party analysis 
applies, does the Court still exercise free review or apply an abuse of 
discretion standard to a district court's determination of prevailing party 
status? 
3. If the Court exercises free review, is the State of Idaho entitled to an 
award of attorney fees and costs as a partially prevailing party under I.e. § 
12-117(2)? 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The two-part test for an award of attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117 applies on appeal as 
well. Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 120, 90 P.3d 340, 345 
(2004). Accordingly, if the State prevails on appeal, it should be awarded its reasonable attorney 
fees and costs as the Contractors have pursued this appeal without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. The district court correctly determined that both parties prevailed in part and, therefore, 
exercised its discretion to determine neither was a prevailing party. Furthermore, the Sate clearly 
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had a reasonable basis in law or fact to prove its affirmative claims against SE/Z in the case 
below. Moreover, the issue of whether the State could maintain its affirmative claims against 
SE/Z involved questions of first impression. In such situations, the Contractors should have 
known, the Court is generally reluctant to find a party acted without a reasonable basis. 
Therefore, the Contractors have pursued this appeal without a reasonable basis in fact or law and 
the State should be awarded its cost and attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees and costs against 
state agencies. An award of fees under I.e. § 12-117 is mandatory, but only if the Court finds in 
favor of the prevailing party and the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law. In this case, the district court did not find in favor of SE/Z or Hobson since no judgment 
was rendered and SE/Z and the State entered into a negotiated settlement to resolve their dispute. 
Therefore, the Contractors are not prevailing parties. 
Furthermore, the State had a reasonable basis In fact or law to pursue its affirmative 
claims against SE/Z. The State discovered numerous construction defects which grossly 
deviated from the plans and specifications, rendering the Lab unfit and dangerous. Despite 
already receiving more than $1.3 million for their work on the Project, the Contractors presented 
the State with a Request for Equitable Adjustment in which they claimed entitlement to over $1.9 
million. Since the State believed it was going to spend more to fix the Contractors' defects than 
the original Contract price, and faced an unreasonable demand for payment from the Contractors, 
it was necessary to defend against the demand and pursue recovery of the amounts spent 
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repairing the defects. The Contract itself allowed the State to pursue its claims against SE/Z. 
The only questions were as to the effect of the termination for convenience and application of the 
claim notice provision. Both of these issues were questions of first impression in Idaho and the 
State found support for its position in both Idaho and federal case law. Therefore, the State had a 
reasonable basis in fact or law to pursue affirmative claims against SE/Z. 
V. ST ANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Rincover v. State Dept. of Finance, this Court concluded that it exercises free review 
of a district court's decision whether to award attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117. 132 
Idaho 547, 549-550, 976 P.2d 473, 475-476 (1999). In reaching its conclusion, the Court 
explained that the two predicates for determination of an award under I.e. § 12-117 do not 
require factual findings but "are more in the nature of legal conclusions, since the first one 
depends upon successfully achieving some form of favorable relief that properly can be granted 
by the court to the 'person,' and the other depends upon the assessment of the conduct of the 
other party ... " Id. The Court has continued to use the free review standard since Rincover. 
Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagerman Highway Dist., 150 Idaho 675, 249 P.3d 868, 879 (2011); 
Ralph Naylor Farms. LLC v. Latah Countv, 144 Idaho 806, 808, 172 P.3d 1081, 1083 (2007); 
Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004). 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE CONTRACTORS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 
IDAHO CODE § 12-117 
This brief will respond to the arguments raised in both Hobson's and SE/Z's appellate 
briefs. Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees and costs against 
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state agencies. Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 247 P.3d 615, 619 (2010); 
Lake CDA Investments, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 285, 233 P.3d 721, 732 
(2010). The statute provides: 
(i) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivisions or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
I.e. § 12-117. 
An award of attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117 is mandatory, but only if "( 1) the court 
finds in favor of the person, and (2) the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law." Stacey v. Idaho Dept. of Labor, 134 Idaho 727, 731, 9 P.3d 530, 534 (2000); Bums 
Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd. of City Com'rs, 147 Idaho 660, 669, 214 P.3d 646,650 
(2009); Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 809, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 
(2007); Reardon v. Magic Vallev Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 
(2004). A party must satisfy both parts of this test to be entitled to attorney fees. 
1. A Rule S4(d)(I)(B) prevailing party analysis does not apply to I.e. § 12-117 
The Contractors argue that the district court erred by failing to find they were prevailing 
parties under I.e. § 12-117 by virtue of a Rule 54(d)(l)(B) prevailing party analysis. They also 
argue that the district court erred by not even mentioning I. e. § 12-117 in its analysis. 
Nevertheless, since this Court exercises free review, whether and how the district court erred is 
really not at issue. This Court will render its own decision on the issue of prevailing party status. 
However, to do so, I.C. § 12-117 has its own test for determining prevailing party status and a 
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Rule 54(d)(1)(B) analysis is inapplicable. Yet, no matter what test is used, the Contractors are 
not prevailing parties. 
In 2000, this Court issued its opinion in Stacey, supra, expressing the two-part test for an 
award of attorney fees under I.C § 12-117. At that time, the statute contained the exact language 
used in the two-part test. However, the Court also noted that the statutory language had recently 
been amended to permit recovery of attorney fees by the "prevailing party" and not just by a 
"person." Id. at fn2. The Court explained that the amendment simply made the recovery of 
attorney fees under the statute a two-way street, allowing a state agency to receive attorney fees 
if it prevails and the adverse party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. See Neighbors 
For Responsible Growth v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 173, 177, 207 P.3d 149, 153 (2009) ("In 
2000, the statute created a 'two-way street,' authorizing an award of attorney fees to either the 
governmental entity or to the person ... "). The amendment still required the court to find "that the 
party against whom the judgment was rendered" acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Id. 
Despite the change from "person" to "prevailing party" in 2000, the Court has continued 
to use the same two-part test expressed in Stacey. See Burns. LLC v. Madison Cnty Bd of Cnty 
Com'rs, 147 Idaho 600, 664, 214 P.3d 646, 650 (2009); Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah 
County, 144 Idaho 806,809, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007): Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and 
Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004). In Reardon, four years after the 
amendment, this Court reiterated that a "prevailing party [under I.C. § 12-117] is one the court 
finds for in a case." 140 Idaho at 119, 90 P.3d at 344. This language echoes the first prong of 
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the Stacey test. In other words, a prevailing party is the party for whom judgment was rendered. 
Neighbors v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho at 177,207 P.3d at 153.3 
2. The Contractors are not prevailing parties because the district court did not 
find in their favor 
In this case, the district court did not render a judgment to either SE/Z or Hobson. To the 
contrary, SE/Z and the State reached a negotiated settlement to resolve their dispute, whereby the 
State did not admit any liability. Therefore, the Contractors are not prevailing parties under I.e. 
§ 12-117 and are not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
a. Even Under a Rule 54(d)(1 )(B) Prevailing Party Analysis, the Contractors 
are Still Not Prevailing Parties 
The Contractors argue that they are "overall prevailing parties" under a Rule 54(d)(1 )(B) 
analysis. Even if a Rule 54(d)(I)(B) analysis applies to I.C. § 12-117, the Contractors are still 
not prevailing parties. Essentially, the Contractors argue they prevailed because they defeated 
the State's cross-claims, retained their own affirmative claims, and received a positive recovery 
from the State. (Appellant SE/Z Construction, LLC's Brief, pp. 10-13 ("SE/Z's Brief"); 
Opening Brief of Co-Appellant Hobson Fabricating Corporation, pp. 33-36 ("Hobson's Brief'». 
However, the Contractors ignore the fact that the State successfully defeated all of Hobson's 
claims, never attempted to dismiss any of SE/Z's claims, and was successful in defeating the 
3 The Idaho legislature amended this statute again in 2010. As part of these amendments, the legislature removed 
the "against whom the judgment is rendered" language and replaced it with the term "nonprevailing party." The 
Court has only discussed the 20 I 0 amendments in one case; Smith v. Wash. County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 247 P.3d 
615 (20 lO). However, the Court in Smith focused on the distinction between "administrative judicial proceedings" 
and "administrative proceedings." 247 P.3d at 619. The Court has not considered what effect removing the "against 
whom the judgment is rendered" language has on the prevailing party status. 
- 12 -
Contractors' attempt to convert the fixed-price contract into a cost-plus contract, thereby 
severely reducing and limiting their $1.9 million claim. 
"In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and 
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed 'in the action.' That 
is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a claim-
by-claim analysis." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010); citing 
Eighteen Mile Ranch. L.L.c.. v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719,117 P.3d 
130, 133 (2005). 
The three principal factors to be considered when determining which party, if any, 
prevailed in a matter are as follows: (1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the 
relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the 
extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. Sanders v. 
Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823, 826 (Ct. App. 2000). An application of these principals 
and factors establishes that, as the district court conectly determined in this case, there was no 
prevailing party to whom costs and attorney fees should be awarded. 
There is not always a prevailing party. See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. 
LP.U.C., 125 Idaho 401,407,871 P.2d 818 (1994); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 130,937 
P.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1997); Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692,819 P.2d 110 (Ct.App. 1991). In 
this case, SE/Z and the State reached a settlement to resolve their dispute. No judgment was 
rendered. Yet, the Contractor's main argument for prevailing party status is that SE/Z received a 
sum of money from the State for settlement. 
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SEll, citing Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69,175 P.3d 754,758 (2007), argues that "[a] 
party who receives a favorable settlement outcome qualifies as a prevailing party for the purpose 
of determining fees and costs unless the settlement agreement states otherwise." (SEll's Brief, p. 
12). This is a misstatement of the holding in Straub. In Straub, this Court simply held that a 
party does not implicitly waive its right to seek costs and fees when a stipulation to dismiss with 
prejudice is silent on the issue. 145 Idaho at 69, 175 PJd at 758. The Court stated: "Hence, we 
hold that although the dismissal was pursuant to IRCP 41(a)(1), the Smiths did not waive their 
claim to fees and costs by failing to expressly reserve that issue in their stipulation." Id. This 
holding does not mean that a party who receives payment through a settlement "qualifies as a 
prevailing party." SEll, simply by receiving payment from the State through a negotiated 
settlement, does not automatically become a prevailing party. 
Moreover, even where a party obtains a judgment for money, they may not be the 
prevailing party. See Yellow Pine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54 
(1983). In Yellow Pine, the plaintiff: a water association, brought a test case in magistrate court 
to collect $234 from a homeowner. At trial, the plaintiff was awarded $56 in water fees and 
disconnect charges. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $318 in costs and $700 in attorney fees 
as the prevailing party. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the trial court's costs 
and fees determination and found the plaintiff was not the prevailing party. Id. 105 Idaho at 352, 
670 P.2d. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Idaho found that the plaintiff "made an excessive 
demand, i.e., $384 (amended at trial to $234), although the proper amount due, i.e., $26, had 
been tendered." Id. In Adams v. Krueger, the plaintiff recovered damages in a negligence action, 
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but was found to be 49% negligent to the defendants' 51 %. The trial court held that although the 
plaintiff recovered damages, that neither party was a prevailing party, and such decision was 
upheld on appeal. 124 Idaho 74,77,856 P.2d 864 (1993). 
Similarly, in Weaver v. Millard, the plaintiffs contractor entered into an oral contract 
with defendants to construct commercial fish ponds. 120 Idaho 692, 695, 819 P.2d 110, 113 (Ct. 
App. 1992). The defendant partnership withheld payment of $18,723.76 to Weaver for work 
completed after the project's costs exceeded expectations. Weaver filed a lien on the property 
and brought an action to foreclose the lien. The partnership filed a counterclaim arguing the 
work was defective. Id. After a six day bench trial, the trial court awarded Weaver $5,813.63 on 
the contract but refused to foreclose on the lien because his statement of demand failed to 
account for deductions and just credits. Id. 120 Idaho at 696, 819 P.2d at 114. The trial court 
arrived at the damage award after deducting: $7,497 paid directly by the defendant to a material 
supplier on behalf of Weaver; $1,313.37 for labor overcharges; $719.76 for concrete 
overcharges; and $3,380 for costs to repair Weaver's poor workmanship. Id. The trial court 
determined neither Weaver nor the partnership prevailed at trial and refused to award attorney 
fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-120. Id. In affirming the trial court's decision, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated: 
The district court concluded that Weaver and the partnership each prevailed on 
one of the two issues between them, but that each received far less than the 
respective relief they sought. The district court reached these conclusions through 
an exercise of reason, and the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
neither Weaver nor the partnership prevailed against the other. 
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120 Idaho at 702-703, 819 P.2d at 120-121; See also, Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 25-26 
72 P.3d 864, 865-866 (2003) (jury ruled in favor of plaintiff for violation of Consumer 
Protection Act and awarded $10,000 in damages, but also ruled in favor of defendants with 
regard to intentional misrepresentation claim. Supreme Court of Idaho upheld district court's 
finding that both parties had prevailed in part and neither was a "prevailing party. "); Stewart v. 
Rice, 120 Idaho 504, 511, 817 P.2d 170, 177 (1991) (plaintiff sought $500,000 for personal 
injury sustained in ski accident. Jury found defendant 90% at fault and awarded $4,504. Despite 
obtaining affirmative relief, trial court held there was no prevailing party); Trilogy Network 
Systems, Inc v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007) (Supreme Court of Idaho upheld 
district court's determination that neither party was a "prevailing party" when jury found 
defendant breached the contract but there were no resulting damages and, therefore, both parties 
prevailed in part). 
In this case, Hobson filed a complaint against SE/Z and the State. SE/Z filed a cross-
claim against the State asserting claims on behalf of itself and Hobson in the amount of 
$1,973,107.38. The State, in turn, filed a counterclaim against Hobson and a counter cross-claim 
against SE/Z. As such, there were multiple claims and issues between the parties. The State's 
claim against SE/Z sought recovery of money the State was forced to expend to secure a working 
and safe Lab. A Lab for which the State had already paid SE/Z $1,362,329.00 at the time it 
terminated SE/Z's contract. The State retained 5% of payments on the Project as well as the 
final payment from SE/Z for a total of $95, 155.00. (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1520, fn2). Yet, despite only 
having $95,155.00 in outstanding pay requests and retainage, the Contractors demanded payment 
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of $1,973,107.38; more than twenty times the amount outstanding. The Contractors' drastically 
inflated demand was directly related to their attempt to convert the fixed-price contract into a 
cost-plus contract. The Contractors argued that the State's termination for convenience allowed 
them to go back and request payment for all of their costs incurred on the Project. As the 
district court noted, "Plaintiff requests that the Court rewrite the clear and unambiguous language 
of the fixed price contract entered into by the parties to include a cost plus penalty for 
termination for convenience." (R. Vol. IV, p. 735). The State successfully defeated this portion 
of the Contractors' claims. 
The Court specifically rejects the contention that the clause converts the fixed 
price contract into a cost-plus contract. The Court finds that the Contactors are 
not entitled under a termination for convenience to receive money they would not 
have received if the contract had been completed. The Court further finds the 
term "Work" does not include all costs incurred by the Contractors, but only 
includes "construction and services required by the Contract Documents" or, to be 
specific, the work done under the contract in accordance with the plans and 
specifications for which the Contractors have not been paid and for which they 
would have been paid had the contract gone to completion. 
(R. Vol. IV, p. 736) 
The Contactors' contention that they were entitled to recover all of their costs because the 
State terminated SE/Z's contract for convenience, was the driving force behind the entire 
litigation. It started with the Contractors' exorbitant REA claim of $1.9 million after the 
termination and continued with the Hobson's Complaint and SE/Z's cross-claim. The State 
successfully defeated this unreasonable claim. 
SE/Z, citing Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 541-42, 224 P.3d 1125, 1130-31 
(2010), argues that it is not proper to consider SE/Z's exorbitant $1.9 million pre-suit demand 
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when determining which party prevailed. (SE/Z's Brief, p. 12, fn.4). However, the court in 
Jorgensen held that "district courts may not consider settlement negotiations in the attorney fees 
determination." rd., at 542, 1131 [Emphases added]. The Contractors' $1.9 million demand was 
a Request for Equitable Adjustment under the Contract. It was a claim; not a settlement offer. 
The Contractors' claim amounted to an excessive litigation demand which must be considered to 
determine the extent to which each party prevailed. 
The State was also prepared to present evidence of the grossly deficient work, including 
pieces of ductwork, malfunctioning dampers, bags of peeled off paint, videos of poorly welded 
duct work and hundreds and hundreds of photographs depicting deficient conditions of the Lab 
as constructed by SE/Z and Hobson, including: acid drain pipes that had holes drilled into it; 
ceiling hangers secured by wrapped wire resulting in waiving ceilings; cabinets meant to hold 
potentially toxic materials attached to walls with molly bolts in drywall instead of metal backing; 
damaged hepa filters; and other non-conformities. However, on the eve of the second trial in this 
matter, the district court barred the State from presenting this evidence and essentially dismissed 
the State's claims and offsets against SE/Z. However, the State retained its defenses to SE/Z's 
claims that the work was not performed in accordance with the plans and specifications. After 
the court's ruling, the State, without admitting liability, agreed with SE/Z to settle the case for 
$225,000. 
The Contractors' claimed damages in the amount 01'$1,973,107.38. There were multiple 
claims and issues involved in this litigation. The State successfully defeated all of Hobson's 
direct claims, just as Hobson succeeded in defeating all of the State's direct claims. The State 
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successfully defeated the Contractors' attempt to rewrite the Contract and turn it into a cost-plus 
contract. Once its counter cross-claim was dismissed, the State settled the case with SE/Z for 
$225,000 or 11.4% of SE/Z's original demand. As such, the State was successful in defending 
against 88% of SE/Z' s claim. This was directly related to the State successfully defeating SE/Z's 
attempt to convert the fixed-price contract into a cost-plus contract. As the district court held: 
"The essential claim of the contractors was that the State's termination for convenience had the 
effect of converting the contract from a Fixed Price Contract to a Cost Plus Contract. Such was 
not the case. In that respect, the State ultimately prevailed." (R. Vo!' VIII, 1558). 
As the district court concluded, the State prevailed in part and the Contractors prevailed 
in part. "This Court has held that when both parties are partially successful, it is within the 
district court's discretion to decline an award of attorney fees to either side." Jorgensen, supra, 
at 538, 1127; see Viking Construction, Inc. v. Hayden Lake lIT. Dist., 149 Idaho 187,200,233 
P .3d 118, 131 (20 J 0) (party not entitled to attorney fees under 1. C. § 12-117 because court found 
both parties prevailed in part); In re Board of Psychologist Examiners' Final Order Case No. 
PSY-PyB-01-010-002, 148 Idaho 542, 548,224 P.3d 1131, 1137 (2010) ("Therefore, because 
both parties have prevailed in part on appeal, neither of them is the prevailing party."). Since the 
Contractors and the State prevailed in part, neither is a prevailing party. 
b. If a Rule 54(d)(l )(B) Prevailing Party Analvsis Applies, the Court Should 
Review This Aspect of the Decision For an Abuse of Discretion 
This Court concluded that it could exercise free review of a district court's decision 
whether to award attorney fees under § I.C. 12-117 because the two predicates for a 
determination were "more in the nature of legal conclusions, since the first one depends upon 
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successfully achieving some form of favorable relief that properly can be granted by the court to 
the 'person,' and the other depends upon the assessment of conduct of the other party ... " 
Rincover, 132 Idaho at 549-550, 976 P.2d at 475-476. If a Rule 54(d)(I)(B) analysis applies to 
determining whether one is a prevailing party for the first predicate, it is no longer in the nature 
of a legal conclusion. It is more in the nature of a factual finding more suitable to an abuse of 
discretion standard as actually applies to a district court's determination of a prevailing party 
under Rule 54(d)(1)(B). Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247, 256 (2000); Adams v. 
Krueger, 124 Idaho 97, 856 P.2d 864, 867 (1993). Therefore, if the prevailing party status for 
the purpose of the first predicate of I.C. § 12-117 is determined through the same analysis used 
to determine a prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1)(B), then an abuse of discretion standard 
should apply to the prevailing party determination. 
c. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining there was no 
overall prevailing party 
If an abuse of discretion standard applies to the first predicate to recovery of attorney fees 
under I.e. § 12-117, then such determination of prevailing party status is committed to the sound 
discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. 
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010). "When examining 
whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the district court: (1) 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion 
and consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason." Id. Only in the rarest of circumstances has the Court reversed a district court's 
determination of which party prevailed. Id. 
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The district court perceived the issue of determining the prevailing party as one of 
discretion. In fact, the district court recited this standard at the beginning of its discussion of the 
prevailing party status. CR. Vol. VIII, 1556:9). The district court stated: "The determination of 
which is the prevailing party and to what extent is within the discretion of the trial court." Id; 
citing J.R. Simplot Co. v. W. heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999). 
The district court also perceived the issue of costs as discretionary. CR. Vol. VIII, 1557:5-8); 
Citing I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)CB); Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 689, 39 P.3d 621, 629 
(2001). Therefore, the district court clearly perceived the issue as one of discretion. 
The district court also acted within the boundaries of that discretion and consistently 
within applicable legal standards. The district court correctly cited the applicable legal standard 
for determining prevailing party status. CR. Vol. VIII, pp. 1556-1557). The district court then 
rendered its decision by an exercise of reason using the applicable legal standards. The district 
court began by summarizing the issues in the lawsuit. It noted that the State terminated its 
contract with SE/Z for convenience. CR. Vol. VIII, p. 1558). "The essential claim of the 
contractors was that the State's termination for convenience had the effect of converting the 
contract from a Fixed Price Contract to a Cost Plus Contract. Such was not the case. In that 
respect, the State ultimately prevailed." (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1558) The district court also noted that 
the State theorized that the contract allowed it to pursue offsets and counterclaims. Although the 
district court allowed the State to pursue its offsets and counterclaims during the first trial, it 
decided to disallow those claims on the eve of the second trial. CR. Vol. VIII, pp. 1558-1559). 
The district court reasoned: 
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When both parties are considered prevailing, the Court may, in its discretion, 
decline an award of costs or fees to either side. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 
914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125 (2009); Ace Realty Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 
750,682 P.2d 1289, 1297 (Ct.App. 1984); see also Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 
24,27, 72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003). In the overall case, both parties were required to 
expend considerable resources both asserting and defending claims. Hobson's 
initial claim against SEll and the State sought more than $1.5 million; SEll's 
cross-claim against the State sought more than $1.9 million; and the State's 
counter-claim sought more than $2.6 million. In the end, the case settled with the 
State paying SEll $225,000.00 with no admission of liability. Over the course of 
five years, numerous other claims were addressed through motion hearings. Each 
party prepared for and conducted three weeks of trial which ended in a mistrial. 
Each party prevailed on some issues and each party lost on other issues. For all 
these reasons, the Court orders each party to bear its own costs and fees. 
(R. Vol. VIII, p. 1559). 
The district court concluded that the State was successful in limiting the contractors 
claims and the Contractors were successful in narrowing the State's counterclaims and offsets. 
In that sense, both parties prevailed. However, the district court exercised its discretion and 
determined that neither party was a "prevailing party" entitled to fees or costs. Since the district 
court perceived the issue as one of discretion and acted within the boundaries of that discretion, 
acted within applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying costs and fees. Therefore, this Court should 
affirm the district court's decision that there was no overall prevailing party. 
3. The Contractors are not entitled to attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117(1) 
because the State acted with a reasonable basis in fact or law 
The Contractors repeatedly assert in their briefs that the State "erroneously 
misinterpreted," "falsely asserted," and "fabricated" an unsupported and unreasonable 
interpretation of the Contract. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the district court 
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agreed with the State's interpretation of the Contract throughout the entire litigation. The district 
court simply changed its mind on the eve of the second trial on an issue which it had previously 
determined was a question of fact. Actually, the district court rejected the Contractors' 
interpretation of the Contract and it is incredulous for them to claim that the State's interpretation 
lacked a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
An award of fees under I.C. § 12-117 requires not only that a party be the prevailing 
party, but that the non-prevailing party to have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. If 
the Court determines that the Contractors are prevailing parties or that the district court abused 
its discretion in that regard, the Contractors are still not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
under I.e. § 12-117 because the State acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law. 
Typically, for purposes of I.e. § 12-117, the Court looks to determine whether there was 
no authority at all for an agency's actions or whether the law was unclear or unsettled as to 
whether the agency had the ability to act. Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 
806, 809, 172 P .3d 1081, 1084 (2007). In this case, the Contractors are not arguing that the State 
lacked authority to do the act which lead to the dispute between the parties; i.e. terminating 
SE/Z's contract for convenience. Rather, the Contractors take exception with the State's 
interpretation of the Contract and its position on the effect of the termination for convenience. 
They argue that since the district court barred the State's cross-claims, the State acted without 
authority to bring its cross-claim. (Hobson's Brief, p. 27). However, having authority to bring a 
cross-claim and having a reasonable basis in law or fact for the cross-claim are separate issues. 
Clearly, the State had the authority to defend itself and pursue counter and cross-claims after it 
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got sued by the Contractors. The real question for purposes of this appeal is whether the State 
had a reasonable basis in law or fact for bringing its cross-claims. The answer to that question is 
a resounding "yes." 
For purposes of I.e. § 12-117, this Court may also look to its decisions regarding awards 
of fees under I.e. § 12-121 because the requirement that the party acted without a reasonable 
basis is similar to the requirement of I.e. § 12-121 that the case be brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada 
County Hwy. Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 695-696, 227 P.3d 942, 949-950 (Ct. App. 2010), citing 
Nation v. State, Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.3d 953, 970 (2007). Under I.e. 
§ 12-121, attorney fees should only be awarded "if the non-prevailing party advocates a plainly 
fallacious, and, therefore, not fairly debatable, position." Lowery v. Bd of Cnty Com'rs for Ada 
County, 115 Idaho 64, 69, 764 P.2d 431,436 (1988). A defense is not frivolous or groundless 
merely because it fails. Id. "A misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is not, by 
itself, unreasonable conduct." Id., quoting Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 
911,684 P.2d 307,313 (Ct. App.1984). 
As indicated, the State terminated SE/Z's Contract for convenience as allowed under the 
Contract. The termination for convenience provisions are located in Article 14.4 of the Contract. 
Subparagraph 14.4.1 provided: 
14.4.1 The Owner may, at any time, terminate the Contract for the Owner's 
convenience and without cause. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 397). 
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Subparagraph 14.4.3, as amended by the Supplementary Conditions provided: 
14.4.3 In the case of such termination for the Owner convenience, the Contractor 
shall be entitled to receive payment from the Owner on the same basis provided in 
Subparagraph 14.1.3, as modified. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 415). 
As modified, Subparagraph 14.1.3 provided: 
14.1.3 If one of the reasons described in Subparagraph 14.1.1 exists, the 
Contractor may, upon seven days' written notice to the Owner and Architect, 
terminate the Contract and recover from the Owner payment for Work executed 
and for proven loss with respect to materials, equipment, tools, and construction 
equipment and machinery, including reasonable overhead and profit. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 396; Vol. lIf, p. 415). 
1.1.3 The term 'Work' means the construction and services required by the 
Contract Documents, whether completed or partially completed, and includes 
another labor, materials, equipment and services provided or to be provided by the 
Contractor to fulfill the Contractor's obligations. The Work may constitute the 
whole or a part of the Project. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 362). 
The Contractors argued that Subparagraph 14.1.3 allowed them to seek recovery of all 
their costs on the Project and the State, by virtue of terminating the Contract for convenience, 
could not pursue any claims, offsets, or defenses to the Contractors' claim. The State argued that 
Subparagraph 14.1.3, in conjunction with the definition of "Work," only allowed the Contractors 
to recover amounts for work executed up to the point of termination, as long as it complied with 
the plans and specifications. The State also argued that Subparagraph 13.4.2 allowed it to pursue 
claims, offsets, and defenses arising out of the Contractors' defective work which was 
discovered after their lawsuit was filed. Subparagraph 13.4.2 provided: 
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13.4.2 No action or failure to act by the Owner, Architect or Contractor shall 
constitute a waiver of a right or duty afforded them under the Contract, nor shall 
such action or failure to act constitute approval or acquiescence in a breach 
thereunder, except as may be specifically agreed in writing. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 394). 
As discussed below, the State had a reasonable basis in fact or law to pursue its claims, 
offsets, and defenses against the Contractors based upon the above quoted Contract language. 
The State filed its cross-claim based upon discovering, after SEll was terminated and after the 
Contractors filed suit, construction defects that were in gross disregard to the Project plans and 
specifications. These defects resulted in an unsafe Lab that would have posed grave danger to 
the employees of the Lab, as well as individuals who work or live near the Project. Moreover, 
the State was facing a situation in which it was going to have to spend more than the original 
contract price to repair the Contractors' defective work and complete the Lab in accordance with 
the plans and specifications. Under these circumstances, the State's decision to pursue its 
claims, offsets, and defenses was entirely reasonable. 
a. The State had a reasonable basis under Idaho law, federal law, and the 
Contract language to assert its cross-claim 
At the outset of this case on April 14, 2006, the Contactors brought motions to preclude 
the State from asserting its claims, offsets, and defenses in this matter based upon the termination 
for convenience. (R. Vol. I, p. 9). In its supporting memorandum, SEll acknowledged "there are 
no Idaho cases analyzing the effect of DPW's termination for convenience at issue in this 
matter" and, therefore, the Contractors relied exclusively on federal case law to support their 
motion. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of SEll Construction, LLC's 
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Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 8, filed April 14, 2006).4 In essence, the Contractors 
argued that, under federal law, simply because the State chose to terminate SE/Z's Contract for 
convenience, rather than for cause, the State could not assert any claims, offsets or defenses 
based upon the Contractors' defective work. In opposition, the State filed numerous affidavits: of 
counsel; Jan Frew; Elaine Hill; Joe Rutledge and Albert Munio as well as a Memorandum in 
Opposition outlining the factual and legal basis for its defenses, offsets and claims.5 As for the 
specific facts, the affidavits outlined the history of the Project, problems that arose on the 
Project, the difficulties the State had with regard to welding issues and others, the Project stalling 
due to inability to obtain balance, the termination of SE/Z for convenience and the subsequent 
discovery of the grossly defective work performed by Hobson and SE/Z. As for the reasonable 
basis in law, the Contract provided that it should be governed by the law of Idaho, not federal 
law. As SE/Z acknowledged, no Idaho cases had analyzed the effect of the termination for 
convenience provision at issue. Therefore, this was a case of first impression. However, that 
does not justify leaping into a body of general federal common law concerning termination for 
convenience clauses, especially when those cases turn on the particular language used in the 
federal contracts involved. Instead, the State argued that the Contract should be interpreted using 
Idaho contract interpretation principles. (Defendant State of Idaho's Opposition to Hobson 
Fabricating Corp.'s and SE/Z Construction LLC's Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 18-30, filed 
May 22, 2006). Subparagraph 13.4.2 of the Contract provided that no action on the part of the 
4 SE/Z's Memorandum has been submitted with the States Motion to Augment the Record. 
S The State's Memorandum in Opposition and the affidavits have been submitted with the State's Motion to 
Augment the Record. 
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parties, such as a termination of the Contract, would constitute a waiver of the parties' rights 
under the Contract. As such, the Contract itself indicated the State's decision to terminate the 
Contract for convenience did not preclude the State from asserting other rights under the 
contract, including breaches, defenses and offsets. 
Moreover, even the federal case law relied upon by the Contractors in seeking summary 
judgment provided a reasonable basis for the State to pursue its claims, offsets and defenses. 
First, the case upon which the Contractors relied most heavily in their briefing, Appeal of New 
York Shipbuilding Co., 1972 WL 1601, 73-1 BCA P 9852 (ASBCA 1972), had been explicitly 
refuted: 
Appellant relies on the rule set forth in New York Shipbuilding Co .... that 
Government offset claims for corrective work are not recoverable where there has 
been a convenience termination. . .. 
. .. [W]e hold that the rule in New York Shipbuilding does not serve as an 
automatic bar to Respondent's counterclaims and that they should be considered 
on their merits. ... The express agreement of the parties on the question takes 
precedence over any contrary holding, particularly of another board whose 
determinations, while accorded great respect, are not controlling on us. 
* * * 
[Tlhe continued applicabilitv of New York Shipbuilding and its forerunners IS 
seriously in doubt. 
* * * 
Finally, even if New York Shipbuilding is still viable, it is distinguishable here on 
the facts. New York Shipbuilding dealt with a termination for convenience early 
in the life of the contract before the contractor was able to correct deficiencies. .. 
In this case, however, termination occurred very late in performance, after 
Appellant had delivered virtually all the hardware to the site, and had ample time 
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to make corrections .... Under such circumstances, it is questionable if New York 
Shipbuilding ever controlled this case. 
Aydin Corp., 1989 WL 74785, 89-3 BCA P 22044 (EBCA 1989) (emphasis added); see also 
Appeal of Air-Cool. Inc., 1987 WL 46144, 88-1 BCA P 20399 (ASBCA 1987) (recognizing that 
it is questionable whether the rule set forth in New York Shipbuilding will continue to be 
followed.) 
Second, despite the Contractors' attempt to paint a picture of "uniform" and "well-
established" federal law supporting their argument, several federal courts had specifically held 
that counter-claims can be raised following a termination tor convenience, as can offsets of the 
contractor's claimed costs. See,~, Appeal of E.A. Cowen Constr., Inc., 1966 WL 651, 66-2 
BCA P 6060 (ASBCA 1966) (allowing for a counter-claim raised by the federal Government 
following its termination tor convenience of a contract); Timberland Paving and Constr. Co. v. 
The United States, 18 CL Ct. 129, 141 (CL Ct. 1989) (holding that the federal Government's 
offset for liquidated damages against the contractor's payment claims was allowable following a 
termination for convenience). 
Lastly, even under the strictest federal cases dealing with termination for convenience, 
the case law has held "that alleged deficiencies stemm[ing] from gross disregard by appellant of 
its contractual obligations [and] the costs of performing such grossly deficient work would be 
considered unreasonable and hence unallowable" following a termination for convenience. See, 
e.g, New York Shipbuilding, 1972 WL 1601, 73-1 BCA P 9852; Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. 
United States, 828 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Under such cases, the costs of performing work 
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are not allowable where "the government established that any defects resulted from [the 
contractor's] gross disregard of its contractual obligations or that any defects are so extensive as 
to render [the contractor's] costs unreasonable." Best Foam Fabricators. Inc. v. United States, 38 
Fed. CI. 627, 641 (Fed. Cl. 1997). Even New York Shipbuilding, the case most heavily relied 
upon by the Contractors, provides an exception for offsets when "it is established that the 
defective production resulted from the contractor's own fault or folly or careless conduct of the 
work or other disregard of his contractual duties." New York Shipbuilding, 1772 WL 1601, 73-1 
BCA P 9852. The same reasoning applies to affirmative claims stemming from such grossly 
deficient, unreasonable, grossly non-conforming, and extensively defective work. See E.A. 
Cowen Construction, 1966 WL 651, 66-2 BCA P 6060. 
After reading the extensive briefing and hearing oral argument, the district court denied 
the Contractors' motion to preclude the State's claims, offsets and defenses. In ruling on the 
motion, the district court found that the federal case law relied upon by the Contractors was not 
controlling, the principles set forth in New York Shipbuilding had been called into question, and 
despite the holding in New York Shipbuilding, the Contractors' entitlement under subparagraph 
14.1.3 did not preclude the State from asserting its affirmative defenses and claims. (R. Vol. II, 
pp. 216-218). The district court turned to Idaho contract interpretation principles and held that 
"Subparagraph 13.4.2 preserves the State's right to sue Hobson and SE/Z for breach of contract 
in connection with their alleged deficient workmanship." (R. Vol. II, p. 218). Therefore, under 
Idaho law, federal law, and the Contract language itself, the State had a reasonable basis to assert 
its claims, offsets, and defenses. 
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b. The State had a reasonable basis in fact or law for arguing that strict 
compliance with the claim notice provision was not required 
On October 27, 2006, SE/Z filed another motion for partial summary judgment arguing 
the State waived its right to pursue its claims, offsets, and defenses. (R. Vol. I, pp. 10-11). 
Hobson joined in the motion. (R. Vol. I, p. 11). In essence, the Contractors argued that the State 
was required to strictly comply with the notice provision set forth in Article 4.3.2 of the Contract 
as a condition precedent to pursuing its claims. (Memorandum in Support of SE/Z Construction, 
LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 11, filed October 27, 2006).6 Article 4.3.2 
provided in pertinent part: "A Claim by either party must be made by written notice to the 
Architect within ten (l0) days from the date that the Claimant knew or should have known of the 
event or condition. Unless the Claim is made within the aforementioned time requirements, it 
shall be deemed to be waived." (R. Vol. II, p. 373). Again, SE/Z acknowledged "there does not 
appear to be any Idaho case law interpreting the Contract provisions at issue in this case." As 
such, this was also a case of first impression. (Memorandum in Support of SE/Z Construction, 
LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 12, filed October 27,2006). 
The State opposed the motion with a reasonable basis. Specifically, the State argued and 
provided evidence establishing SE/Z and Hobson had actual notice with regard to at least 
portions of the defective work and that neither SE/Z nor Hobson were prejudiced by not having 
received notice that strictly complied with the Contract provisions. (Defendant State of Idaho's 
Opposition to SE/Z Construction, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff 
6 SE/Z's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment has been submitted with the State's 
Motion to Augment the Record. 
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Hobson Fabricating Corp.'s Joinder in SEll's Motion, pp. 14-23).7 The evidence indicated that 
the Contractors' defects were so egregious that they had to have actual knowledge of their 
existence before they were deliberately concealed and hidden from the State. The State further 
cited to several Idaho cases holding that strict compliance with contractual notice requirements is 
not always required, including in situations with actual notice and a lack of prejudice. See Quinn 
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 71 Idaho 449, 452,232 P.2d 965,966 (1951) and Leach 
v. Farmer's Automobile Interinsurance Exchange, 70 Idaho 156, 161,159,213 P.2d 920,922-23 
(1950). 
As in Quinn and Leach, the Idaho courts have held in a variety of 
circumstances that a party need not strictly comply with contractual notice 
provisions. See Olson Bros. v. Hurd, 20 Idaho 47, 116 P. 358, 361 (1911) 
(holding that a party sufficiently complied with the notice provisions of a sales 
contract requiring notice provided to a particular location by providing oral notice 
to the other party at a different location); Thompson v. Fairchild, 93 Idaho 584, 
587,468 P.2d 316, 319 (1970) (holding, with respect to notice of forfeiture under 
a land sale contract: "[W]hether or not the formal requirements regarding the 
giving of notice as prescribed by the written instrument were complied with is 
immaterial where it is clear that notice was in fact received. The record further 
demonstrates that appellant was in no way prejudiced .... "); Wickahoney Sheep 
Co. v. Sewell, 273 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1959) (applying Idaho law in a diversity 
jurisdiction case, and holding: "The purpose of notice of default in the usual case 
is to give the party allegedly in default an opportunity to remedy the default and 
meet his obligation, and notice in the prescribed manner [under a contract] is not 
required where a party has actual notice and has not suffered prejudice.") (internal 
citations omitted). 
This is equally true in the construction context. In Beco v. Roberts & Sons 
Constr. Co., Inc., the Idaho Supreme Court allowed a subcontractor to pursue his 
claims for extra work against the prime contractor on a construction project. 
Beco, 114 Idaho 704, 760 P.2d 1120 (1988). This was despite the fact that, as the 
7 The State's Opposition to SE/Z's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment has been submitted with the State's 
Motion to Augment the Record. 
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dissent in Beco noted, the subcontractor did not comply with the contract's notice 
provisions, which were remarkably similar to the notice provisions in the Contract 
at hand. See id. at 719-20, 760 P.2d at 1135-36. The contract provided "that 
extra work claims 'shall be deemed waived by Subcontractor unless written notice 
thereof is given the Contractor within ten days after the date of its origin." Id. at 
719, 760 P.2d at 1135. Although the subcontractor failed to provide written 
notice of its claims for extra work until months after the ten-day period had 
elapsed, the Court allowed the subcontractor's claims to proceed and upheld the 
jury's verdict in favor of the subcontractor on its claims for extra work. See also 
Consolidated Concrete Co. v. Empire West Constr. Co., Inc., 100 Idaho 234, 236-
37, 596 P.2d 106, 108-09 (1979) (holding that a subcontractor need not strictly 
comply with the statutory notice provisions contained in Idaho Code § 54-1927, 
governing claims for labor, services, or equipment provided on a public works 
construction project, and noting that the question of whether a party has received 
notice "is a question of fact.") (emphasis added); accord Sch. Dist. No. 91, 
Bonneville Cty., State of Idaho, For the Use & Benefit of Idaho Concrete Prods., 
Inc. v. Taysom, 94 Idaho 599, 603, 495 P.2d 5, 9 (1972); see also Hoel-Steffen 
Constr. Co. v. United States, 456 F.2d 760, 768 (U.S.Cl.Ct. 1972) (holding that 
"notice provisions in contract -adjustment clauses [should] not be applied too 
technically and illiberally where the [other party] is quite aware of the operative 
facts."); Calfon Constr. Inc. v. United States, 18 CLCt. 426, 439 (U.S. CL Ct. 
1989) (emphasizing the issue of whether a party has knowledge of the essential 
facts when assessing whether additional provision of notice was necessary under a 
contract-adjustment clause.) 
Id., at pp. 15-16. 
In accordance with the foregoing precedent, the State argued that it was appropriate for 
the district court to consider whether the Contractors had actual notice of the underlying facts 
supporting the State's claims and whether they were prejudiced by any lack of compliance with 
the notice provisions. The State also clarified that by the time it discovered the significant latent 
defects, it had already been sued by the Contractors. Providing written notice to the Project 
Architect who was no longer involved with the Project, after litigation had commenced, would 
have been illogical and of no benefit to any party. 
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On January 4, 2007, the district court heard argument on these motions. In denying the 
Contractors' motions, the Court noted that "Idaho law is silent on whether or not strict or 
substantial compliance is required in the precise situation before the Court. There is a split of 
authority over the issue of strict or substantial compliance with notice provisions." (R. Vol. II, p. 
245). The district court found: 
DPW has raised genuine issues of fact regarding whether or not SE/Z received 
actual notice of the allegations contained in the compliance and whether or not 
SE/Z was prejudiced by the lack of strict compliance. See Defendant State of 
Idaho's Opposition to SE/Z Construction, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Plaintiff Hobson Fabricating Corp.'s Joinder in SE/Z's Motion, p. 
17-22 (summarizing numerous affidavits that create genuine issue of material fact 
over whether or not SE/Z had actual notice of the alleged breaches of contract and 
whether or not SE/Z suffered any prejudice by not receiving notice in strict 
compliance with the contract). Therefore, the Court denies SE/Z's motion for 
summary judgment based on the failure to strictly comply with the notice 
provISIOn. 
(R. Vol. II, pp. 245-246). 
Alternatively, the Court further noted that even under a strict compliance standard, a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether SE/Z waived its right to strict compliance by 
having knowledge of the defective work and deceptively masking the same. (R. Vol. II, p. 246). 
Specifically, the district court found that the State's allegations that the Contractors were aware 
of their deficient work and, rather than rectify the situation, deceptively masked their 
substandard work, was supported by the affidavits submitted. (R. Vol. II, p. 247). 
On March 19, 2007, SE/Z filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's February 27, 2007, 
ruling on the Notice issue. (R. Vol. I, p. 14). In denying the motion for reconsideration, the 
Court stated: 
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The contractors also presented deposition testimony of certain people who were 
themselves unaware of any deceptive attempts on the part of the contractors to 
hide poor workmanship. However, the State presented evidence that inspections 
after the termination of the contract unveiled serious concealed defects with the 
contractor's work. Thus, SEll and Hobson have not eliminated the questions of 
fact that preclude the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4).8 
SEll filed a motion in limine on September 15, 2008, requesting the district court to 
require the State to show it provided actual notice and an opportunity to cure defective work to 
SEll prior to allowing any presentation of the State's claims. (R. Vol. II, pp. 288A-288D; 
288X-288EE). The district court denied this motion as an untimely motion for summary 
judgment. Subsequently, SEll filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied 
based upon the showing made by the State of actual notice, lack of prejudice and SEll's waiver 
of strict compliance. (R. Vol. II, pp. 299UU-28811J). 
During the trial, on October 30, 2008, the Court explained: 
THE COURT: But the whole question of 
3. notice, the reason I didn't grant summary judgment 
4. on that point months ago was the question of 
5. waiver and prejudice. And I think that there 
6. is I mean, to be just slightly more specific, I 
7. had ruled that there was a genuine issue of 
8. material fact regarding SEll getting "actual" 
9. notice and whether or not there was no prejudice 
10. suffered by lack of strict compliance with the 
11. notice requirements. 
12. So that's an open question, and it 
13. seems to me to be sort of disingenuous of me to 
14. reverse myself on that just in the interest of 
8 The Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration has been submitted with the State's Motion to Augment the 
Record. 
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15. time and just say, sorry, they didn't send notice 
16. and they can't pursue their claim. 
THE COURT: And if there's a genuine issue 
13. of material fact, with respect to that issue, 
14. which it seems to me that there's a pretty high 
15. likelihood that there will be a genuine issue of 
16. material fact that would remain about actual 
17. notice and nonprejudice. I mean, it may not be 
18. just crystal clear that there was no prejudice or 
19. that there was prejudice, but it seems to me it's 
20. still going to be a factual determination by a 
2l. Jury. 
(R. Vol. IV, pp. 683-684). 
Even though the district court thought it would be disingenuous to reverse itself on this 
Issue, that is exactly what it did when it issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Plaintiffs Motions in Limine on March 26, 20lO. However, that does not change the fact that 
the State had a reasonable basis in fact and law to argue strict compliance with the notice 
provision was not required in this case. 
c. The Court is generallv reluctant to find an action unreasonable when 
dealing with questions of first impression 
In Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd of Com'rs, this court recently explained in conjunction 
with a claim for attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117 that "[w]hen dealing with an issue of first 
impression, this court is generally reluctant to find an action unreasonable. 151 Idaho 123, 254 
P.3d 24, 36 (2011); see also, Kootenai Med. Ctr. ex reI. Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 886, 216 P.3d 630, 644 (2009); Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of health and 
Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 266-67, 207 P.3d 988, 997-98 (2009). The issues with which the 
- 36 -
Contractors argue the State's position lacked a reasonable basis in law or fact were, admittedly, 
questions of first impression. 
SE/Z and the district court specifically acknowledged that the issues involved were 
questions of first impression. In State of Idaho. Dept. of Finance, v. Resource Service Co, Inc., 
134 Idaho 282, 1 P.3d 783 (2000) ("RSC II"), this Court discussed I.e. § 12-117 as applied to a 
situation involving a question of first impression. The Department of Finance brought suit 
against Resource Service Company, Inc. ("RSC"), alleging RSC marketed unregistered securities 
by soliciting a $40.00 fee from customers to enter their names in a BLM lottery for gas and oil 
leases. 134 Idaho at 283, 1 P.3d at 784. The district court granted summary judgment for the 
Department of Finance and RSC appealed. In Dept. of Finance v. Resource Service Co., 130 
Idaho 877, 950 P.2d 249 (1997) ("RSC I"), this Court reversed the district court, holding that 
RSC's program did not constitute an investment contract and, accordingly, was not governed by 
the Idaho Securities Act. Id. Pursuant to the RSC I decision, the district court dismissed the 
Department's complaint and RSC requested attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. Id. The 
district court denied the request because it could not conclude the Department acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Id. RSC appealed. 
RSC argued that because this Court found that its program did not involve the sale of 
securities in RSC I, the Department acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. However, 
this Court stated: "The fact that this Court subsequently determined that RSC's program did not 
constitute a security does not, in and of itself, establish that the Department acted unreasonably 
or without legal or factual basis in maintaining suit against RSC." Id., at 284, 785. The crux of 
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RSC's argument was that the Department refused to find merit in a particular case which this 
Court relied upon in rendering its decision in RSC 1. However, the Court noted that while it 
cited favorably to the case, other courts addressing the issue have found to the contrary. The 
issue of whether the lottery program constituted a "security" was a question of first impression in 
Idaho. In analyzing this case, the Court reviewed two other cases involving I.e. § 12-117 and 
questions of first impression: Rincover v. State, Dept. of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 473 
(1999); and Treasure Valley Concrete. Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673,978 P.2d 233 (1999). In 
both cases, the State did not prevail on its arguments, but since the issues were questions of first 
impression, the Court could not conclude the Stated acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. 
Likewise, in this case the crux of the Contractors' argument is that the terms of the 
Contract were clear and unambiguous and since the district court ultimately decided the State 
could not pursue its claims and offsets that necessarily means the State acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. However, just because the district court eventually agreed with 
the Contractors on these issues, does not mean the State did not have a reasonable basis in fact or 
law for its position. In light of the lack of case law in Idaho on these issues, and the decisions 
from other jurisdictions cited by the State in support of its position, the State had a reasonable 
basis in fact and law for the arguments it proffered. 
d. The District Court agreed with the State's interpretation of the clear and 
unambiguous provisions of the Contract 
SE/Z repeatedly states in its briefing that the Contract between it and the State was clear 
and unambiguous. SE/Z also argues that the State's interpretation of the Contract must 
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necessarily be unreasonable even if the terms were ambiguous because those ambiguities must 
be construed against the State as the drafter of the Contract, "effectively nullifying its 
interpretation." (SE/Z briefp.14). SE/Z's argument is illogical. "A contract term is ambiguous 
when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical." Knipe 
Land Co .. v. Robertson, 2011 WL 2039635, *4 (Idaho, May 26,2011) (emphasis added), quoting 
Potlatch Education Ass'n v. Potlatch School District No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 
1277, 1280 (20 lO). If the Contract terms were ambiguous, and in order to be ambiguous the 
terms must be susceptible to differing reasonable interpretations, then by definition the State's 
interpretation was reasonable. 
In reality, the district court only analyzed a handful of the provisions in its discussions as 
to what was clear and unambiguous. It held subparagraph 14.1.3 was clear and unambiguous. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 216). Subparagraph 14.4.3 was part of the Termination for Convenience 
provisions and provided: 
In the case of such termination for the Owner convenience, the Contractor shall be 
entitled to receive payment from the Owner on the same basis provided n 
Subparagraph 14.l.3. 
Subparagraph 14.1.3 stated: 
If one of the reasons described in Subparagraph 14.1.1 exists, the Contractor may, 
upon seven days' written notice to the Owner and Architect, terminate the 
Contract and recover from the owner payment for Work executed and for proven 
loss with respect to materials, equipment, tools, and construction equipment and 
machinery, including reasonable overhead, [and] profit. 
(R. Vol. II, p. 216). 
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The district court held this language was clear and unambiguous and entitled SE/Z to 
recover the losses described therein. Id. Interestingly, it was by this Subparagraph that SE/Z 
claimed it was allowed to recover all of its costs incurred on the Project, totaling $1.9 million. 
SE/Z argued that the definition of "Work" was the equivalent to the "total cost method" of 
establishing damages. (R. Vol. IV, p. 627). The State disputed the Contractors' definition of 
"Work," and their claim to all costs under the provision. The district court agreed with State's 
interpretation of this Subparagraph and held that SE/Z could not use the "total cost method" to 
establish its damages. Id. Rather, the burden would be upon SE/Z to prove the "Work" that had 
been executed but for which it had not yet been paid, and that such "Work" was done in 
accordance with the plans and specifications. (R. Vol. IV, p. 623, 627). Therefore, since the 
district court agreed with the State's interpretation of this provision, the State's position had a 
reasonable basis in fact and law. Furthermore, since this Subparagraph was deemed clear and 
unambiguous, it was by definition only susceptible to one reasonable interpretation. The district 
court agreed with the State's interpretation. Therefore, by definition, SE/Z's interpretation was 
unreasonable. Since SE/Z's interpretation was unreasonable, it did not have a reasonable basis in 
fact or law for its position. 
The other provisions the district court determined were clear and unambiguous were 
Subparagraphs 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 which pertain to Change Orders. (R. Vol. IV, p. 406). The 
Contractors' claim to all of their costs necessarily included amounts for which they had already 
been paid pursuant to a change order. The district court held: "The contract language is not 
ambiguous and clearly states that the waiver of future claims that accompanies accepting a 
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change order applies to both direct and indirect costs .... The plain language of the contract bars 
SE/Z from claiming any additional costs associated with the hot gas bypass." (R. Vol. II, p. 258). 
This holding was eventually extended to apply to all change orders. (R. Vol. IV, p. 624). 
Therefore, this is another example of the district court agreeing with the State's interpretation of 
a clear and unambiguous provision, rendering SE/Z's interpretation unreasonable and the State's 
interpretation reasonable. 
SE/Z also argues that the State's interpretation of the clear and unambiguous notice 
requirement was unreasonable. However, the dispute over this provision had nothing to do with 
interpreting its language. Rather, as the district court explained, "the question is not whether the 
contractual provision is ambiguous; rather the question is whether actual notice, together with 
lack of prejudice, is an exception to the strict notice requirement. Under Idaho case law cited in 
the original decision, the answer to that question must be answered in the affirmative." (Order 
Denying Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4). As the district court acknowledged, the State had a 
reasonable basis in Idaho law for its position. While the district court originally determined there 
was a question of fact regarding whether SE/Z was prejudiced by the lack of strict compliance, it 
ultimately reversed itself and decided SE/Z was prejudiced because it did not have the 
opportunity to address the alleged defects. However, that does not change the fact that the 
State's position was supported by a reasonable basis in Idaho law that an exception to strict 
compliance of a notice requirement could apply. 
Lastly, SE/Z argues that the State's position that it should be allowed to seek affirmative 
claims and offsets was unreasonable. In ruling upon the Contractors' frrst motions for partial 
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summary judgment seeking to dismiss the State's claims and offsets, the district court held that 
Subparagraph 13.4.2 preserved the State's right to sue the Contractors for breach of contract in 
connection with their deficient work. (R. VoL II, p. 218). While the district court did not 
specifically state that this provision was clear and unambiguous, it did agree with the State's 
interpretation of the provision. Despite SE/Z's contention, the district court never changed its 
position with respect to this provision or the State's interpretation thereof. In its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motion in Limine in which the court barred the State's cross-
claims and offsets, the district comi stated: "While [subparagraph 13.4.2] on its face allows the 
State to pursue its own independent claims against the contractors, the Court finds that its ability 
to pursue those actions is otherwise foreclosed by its failure to provide notice and the 
opportunity to cure." (R. Vol. IV, p. 626). Accordingly, the district court reiterated that the 
State's interpretation of the contract language was correct in that it allowed the State to pursue 
affirmative claims against SE/Z. The district court simply reversed itself on what it had 
previously determined was a question of fact. Therefore, the State had a reasonable basis in 
Idaho law to bring its affirmative claims and offsets. 
e. Considering all factors, the State had a reasonable basis in fact or law for 
asserting its cross-claims, offsets, and defenses in this case 
In mid October 2008, the case proceeded to trial and a mistrial was declared prior to the 
State's opportunity to put on its case in chief~ and establish the facts necessary to support its 
claims, offsets and defenses. The Court further ordered a freeze on discovery and motion 
practice other than motions in limine regarding specific evidence issues. As such, the case 
remained essentially dormant until March 2010, at which time Hobson filed its Motions in 
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Limine and Motion to Dismiss Rudeen. Hobson's motion In limine raised the exact same 
arguments previously raised in the summary judgment motions regarding the effect of the 
termination for convenience and notice requirements. SE/Z joined in Hobson's motion. The 
State objected to the motion as it was an untimely motion for summary judgment veiled as a 
motion in limine and in direct contravention of the district court's order freezing motion practice. 
(R. Vol. II, pp. 297-301). Despite the State's objection, and the freeze on motion practice, the 
district court allowed the Contractors' motion. The district court reversed its previous rulings on 
the issues and granted the Contractors' motion in limine which precluded the State from 
asserting any claim or offset with regard to defective work discovered after the termination for 
convenience, and for which no notice and opportunity to cure had been provided. (R. Vol. IV, 
pp. 730-742). On the other hand, it is important to note that the district court did not bar the 
State from asserting its defenses to the Contractors' claims based upon the work not meeting the 
plans and specifications. The Contractors had attempted to preclude the State from even 
asserting defenses to their claims, but the State was successful in maintaining its ability to assert 
as a defense the grossly defective work performed by the Contractors. (R. Vol. IV, p. 737). 
Despite the district court's ultimate ruling, the State had a reasonable basis in fact and 
law to file and assert its claims and offsets in this action. Specifically, the Contractors performed 
grossly defective work on the Project that was not discovered until after SE/Z was terminated for 
convenience and after the Contractors filed their lawsuit. Federal case law discussing 
terminations for convenience provided that certain exceptions to the general rule would allow an 
owner to assert damages and/or offsets against a contractor terminated for convenience when the 
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work performed by the contractor was defective and payment of additional funds would not be 
"reasonable." The Contract provided that a termination for convenience did not preclude the 
State from pursuing its other rights under the contract, including its right to allege breach of 
contract and assert offsets. Finally, Idaho law held that strict compliance with notice provisions 
were not required if it could be shown that the Contractors had actual notice and that such actual 
notice did not prejudice the Contractors. On repeated occasions, the district court ruled in the 
State's favor on each of the above issues, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
each of these matters. 
Unfortunately for the State, it was not allowed to present its evidence to a jury in 
this matter. However, the mere fact that the State's claims and offsets related to defective work 
were not successful, does not mean they were without a reasonable basis in fact or law. A 
defense is not frivolous or groundless merely because it fails. Lowery v. Bd of Cntv Com'rs for 
Ada County, 115 Idaho at 69; 764 P.2d at 436. "A misperception of law or of one's interest 
under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable conduct." Id. In light of the evidence presented by 
the State that the Contractors' work was in gross disregard of the plans and specifications, it was 
going to cost more than the original contract price to repair the defects, the Contractors were 
seeking payment of an additional $1.9 million despite those defects, and the fact that these issues 
presented questions of first impression, the State was entirely reasonable for pursuing its claims, 
offsets, and defenses. 
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B. THE CONTRACTORS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AS 
PARTIALLY PREVAILING PARTIES UNDER I.C § 12-117(2) 
1. The Contractors did not argue they were partially prevailing parties to the 
district court 
"The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for 
the first time on appeal." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008) 
quoting Crowley v. Critchfield, 2007 WL 4245905 at *3 (Idaho, Dec. 5, 2007). In the 
Contractors' Joint Motion for Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees, the Contractors only sought 
an award of fees as the overall prevailing parties under I.e. § 12-117(1). (R. Vol. V, pp. 867-
870). They did not seek, even in the alternative, an award of fees as partially prevailing parties 
under I.C. § 12-117(2). Therefore, the Contractors are raising this issue for the first time on 
appeal and the Court should deny their request for an award of attorney fees under I.e. § 12-
117(2). 
2. The same test applies under I.C § 12-117(2) as under I.C § 12-117(1) 
If the Contractors are allowed to seek attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117(2), they need to 
satisfy the same two-part test applied under I.C. § 12-117(1). I.e. § 12-117(2) provides that if a 
party prevails on a portion of the case, and the court finds that the non prevailing party acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, the court shall 
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees with respect to that portion of the case on 
which it prevailed. I.C. § 12-117(2). 
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The Contractors were successful in obtaining a motion in limine limiting the State's 
ability to present evidence to support its cross-claims in the second trial. However, no judgment 
was rendered for the Contractors and, therefore, they are not prevailing parties. 
Assuming the Contractors are "partially prevailing parties" with respect to that portion of 
the case in which they successfully prevented the State from presenting evidence as to its cross-
claims, they are still not entitled to attorney fees on that portion of the case because the State 
acted with a reasonable basis in law or fact. As discussed fully above, the interpretation of the 
termination for convenience provision and whether or not strict compliance with the notice 
provision was required presented questions of first impression. Idaho and federal case law 
supported the State's position. The district court agreed with the State's position for five years. 
In fact, the district court continued to agree with the State's position as to the applicable law. 
Unfortunately, the district court changed its mind on an issue it had previously determined was a 
question of fact. Therefore, under these circumstances, the State acted with a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
3. If the Contractors are partially prevailing parties, then so is the State 
If the Court allows the Contractors to seek attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117(2) for the 
first time on appeal, then under its free review, it should also determine that the State is a 
partially prevailing party. As discussed above, the district court held that the State partially 
prevailed in the case because it successfully defeated the Contractors' attempt to change the 
fixed-price contract into a cost-plus contract. Therefore, it prevailed on this portion of the case. 
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The Contractors also did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law on this issue. 
Despite the fact the district court determined subparagraph 14.1.3 of the Contract to clearly and 
unambiguously provide that the Contractors may only seek payment for "Work" that had been 
performed but not yet paid, the Contractors continued to unreasonably and without any basis in 
law, argue they were entitled to recover all of their costs under that provision. The district court 
explained: 
Based upon the Court's July 24, 2006, Memorandum Decision and Order holding 
that that subparagraph 14.1.3 of the prime contract is clear and unambiguous, the 
Contractors contend that the defined term "Work" should be interpreted to mean 
all costs incurred by the Contractors before the termination for convenience. 
Plaintiff requests that the Court rewrite the clear and unambiguous language of 
the fixed price contract entered into by the parties to include a cost-plus penalty 
for termination for convenience. 
The Court specifically rejects the contention that the clause converts the fixed 
price contract into a cost-plus contract. The Court finds that the Contractors are 
not entitled under a termination to receive money they would not have received if 
the contract had been completed. The Court further finds the term "Work" does 
not include all costs incurred by the Contractors, but only includes "construction 
and services required by the Contract Documents" or, to be specific, the work 
done under the contract in accordance with the plans and specifications for which 
the Contractors have not been paid and for which they would have been paid had 
the contract gone to completion. 
(R. Vol. IV, pp. 735-736). 
Furthermore, the Contractors did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law when they 
attempted to obtain a double recovery of cots associated with work that had been agreed upon 
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through change orders. The district court held that "[t]he contract language is not ambiguous and 
clearly states that the waiver of future claims that accompanies accepting a change order applies 
to both direct and indirect costs ... The plain language of the contract bars SE/Z from claiming 
any additional costs associated with the hot gas by pass." (R. Vol. IV, p. 624). 
As is clear from the district court's rulings, the Contractors had neither a reasonable basis 
in law nor fact for their claim that the Contract language allowed them to seek all their costs in 
the amount of $1.9 million. It was not supported by the clear and unambiguous language of the 
Contract or the change orders. This unsubstantiated and unfounded claim drove this litigation 
and required the State to expend hundreds of thousands of dollars defending this unreasonable 
demand. Accordingly, upon free review, this Court should fmd that the State is a partially 
prevailing party under I.C. § 12-117(2) and entitled to its reasonable costs and attorney fees 
associated with this portion of the case. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING THE INDIVIDUAL 
DEFENDANTS THEIR COSTS UNDER I.R.c.P. S4(d)(1)(C) 
"The award of costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs is subject to the trial 
court's discretion." Perrv v. Magic Valley Reg. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,59,995 P.2d 816, 829 
(2000). The party challenging the award has the burden of proving the trial court's abuse of 
discretion. Id. 
Hobson argues that the district court erred by applying the wrong standard for 
determining a prevailing party. It argues the district court should have used an overall 
perspective because the case involved multiple actions and multiple parties. However, Hobson 
ignores the fact that its claims against the individual defendants were unrelated and separate from 
- 48-
the other claims in the case. The district court specifically found that the individuals "were not 
parties to the multiple claims and counterclaims between the State and the Contractors that 
comprised the overall case." (R. Vol. VIII, 1557). The district court also noted that Hobson's 
claims against the individual defendants were dismissed on summary judgment which was "the 
most favorable outcome they could possibly achieve." Id. 
Under these circumstances, the individual defendants were clearly prevailing parties with 
respect to the claims by Hobson and the district court did not abuse its discretion in so holding. 
The district court's award of costs to the individual defendants should be affirmed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 is only proper if a party qualifies as a 
"prevailing party" and the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. 
Neither SE/Z nor Hobson are "prevailing parties" and the State, at all times in this litigation, 
acted with a reasonable basis in fact or law. Therefore, the Contractors are not entitled to an 
award of attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117 and this Court should affirm the district court's 
decision. In addition, the Contractors pursued this appeal without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law, and this Court should award the State its attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
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